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ment of his excise taxes, such a decision would have been in accord with
the law in the majority of jurisdictions which have decided this issue.57
KURT L. JONES
IX. HABEAS CORPUS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Federal Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus' is a civil remedy2 by which petitioners may
challenge the legality of their restraintA Habeas corpus jurisdiction over
persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment was granted to
federal courts by the Act of 1867.1 By exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction,
federal courts can supervise state court adjudication of constitutional
claims.' Federal scrutiny of state courts ensures the protection of federal
constitutional rights of state prisoners.'
5' See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
The term "habeas corpus" refers to the common law writ known as habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, the "Great Writ." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976). See
generally D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF PowER AND LIBERTY
(1966) [hereinafter cited as MEADOR].
2 Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906).
3 Custody is a jurisdictional requirement of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
A habeas petitioner need not be physically imprisoned; a significant restraint of his liberty
satisfies the custody requirement. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); see, e.g.,
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (restraints placed on petitioner during
release on own recognizance pending appeal from state court conviction constitutes "custody"
for purposes of habeas jurisdiction); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (habeas jurisdic-
tion exists when petitioner in custody at time habeas application filed, notwithstanding his
subsequent release); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (court had habeas jurisdiction to
review petitioner's sentence scheduled for later service); see note 9 infra.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(1970)). The Act of 1867 and the fourteenth amendment were instituted by Congress to
protect blacks from the "Black Codes" which had the effect of returning them to slave status.
See McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
533, 535 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Due Process].
The American system of federalism dictates that state courts and federal courts share
the responsibility of administering federal constitutional law. The doctrine of federal-state
comity requires federal courts to defer consideration of federal constitutional questions raised
in prosecutions under state law until state courts have fully considered those questions.
Developments in the Law - Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1048 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). One commentator has suggested,
however, that a desire for equality of justice has properly been considered more important
than principles of federalism. Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 249, 258 (1968). But see Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 953-954 (1965) (application of Bill of Rights to states should not be
regarded as an inflexible code of criminal procedure).
6 Historically, the common law writ of habeas corpus has been issued by courts to protect
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The federal habeas corpus statute confers federal court jurisdiction only
over petitioners satisfying the custody requirement of the statute. 7 The
judicial expansion of the common law concept of "custody" ' has increased
significantly the number of petitioners who satisfy this requirement.' The
Fourth Circuit in Wright v. Bailey ° considered whether the imposition of
a fine alone was sufficient to constitute "custody" within the meaning of
the federal habeas corpus statute." The district court's finding that habeas
corpus jurisdiction did not exist for consideration of a challenge of a disor-
derly conduct conviction by one of the Wright petitioners was affirmed by
individual liberty through judicial power to determine jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
This historic function of the writ provided the basis for the expansion of statutory habeas
corpus jurisdiction, empowering federal courts to ensure that federal constitutional rights of
state prisoners are being protected at the state level. Due Process, supra note 4, at 537.
Selective application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment was aimed at implementing uniform constitutional standards for
criminal proceedings at state and federal levels. Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L. J. 895, 898 (1966).
Commentators have argued that federal courts necessarily must review state court determina-
tions because the state courts alone are unable to effectively administer the new constitu-
tional guidelines. Due Process, supra note 4, at 537. Arguably, state court awareness that
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction may overcome state procedural barriers encourages state
vindication of federal rights. Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exer-
cise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 442 (1961). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is
"unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to consti-
tutional rights" in state courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970) requires that a habeas petitioner be "in custody" before
federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over his application for the writ of habeas corpus.
'See Oaks, Legal History In The High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451
(1966). In both its early statutory and common law forms the writ of habeas corpus could be
issued only if the petitioner was "subject to an immediate and confining restraint" on his
liberty. Id. at 469. Early state court decisions and Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920)
held that the writ of habeas corpus was unavailable to a petitioner not in actual restraint or
imprisonment. Id.
9 See note 3 supra. The "custody" requirement of habeas jurisdiction has recently under-
gone an era of liberal interpretation by the Supreme Court. Due Process, supra note 4, at 542.
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that although a paroled petitioner may not be in a state of
"immediate physical imprisonment," conditions imposed upon him may sufficiently restrain
his freedom so as to place him in "custody" for purposes of exercising habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). The Supreme Court later held that the
custody requirement was satisfied where the habeas corpus petitioner's sentence had expired
and he was released before the final adjudication of his habeas petition. Carafas v. LaVallee,
391 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1968).
Restrictions resulting from the petitioner's conviction, such as loss of voting rights, were
deemed to satisfy the custody requirement. Id. at 237. In both Jones and Carafas, the peti-
tioners were in physical custody when applications for the habeas writs were submitted.
However, the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973), recognized
that the custody requirement for jurisdiction of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
could be independently supported by civil liabilities such as petitioner's need to maintain a
stay of incarceration. Id. at 352. The Hensley petitioner, who had been released on his own
recognizance pending an appeal, was ruled to be in "custody" within the meaning of the
federal habeas corpus statute. Id. at 353.
10 544 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 72 (1977).
1 544 F.2d at 739.
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the Fourth Circuit.' 2
The habeas corpus petitions of the Wright defendants were consoli-
dated for disposition by the district court because both convictions were
the product of one transaction and involved the same defendants.'3 Peti-
tioner Steven Wright was convicted of disorderly conduct and fined $50.
In addition, he received a $50 fine and a suspended jail sentence for unlaw-
fully resisting arrest. Petitioner Clarence Wright was found guilty of un-
lawfully resisting arrest, and assault and battery on a police officer. He
received a 30 day jail sentence and a $50 fine on each charge.
There was no issue as to the "custody" of Clarence Wright because of
his jail sentence. 4 The petitioners, however, argued that Steven Wright's
nonpayment of the fine for his disorderly conduct conviction would result
in imprisonment and this "expectation of future imprisonment" should
constitute "custody".' 5 Nevertheless, imposition of a fine alone does not
involve a threat of incarceration. Steven Wright's original conviction was
for disorderly conduct and the only penalty was a fine. Nonpayment of the
fine could result in a finding of contempt for which the penalty would be
incarceration. Therefore, incarceration would be the result of a contempt
conviction and not the original conviction.'" The Fourth Circuit held that
a fine alone is not sufficient to constitute "custody" for purposes of estab-
lishing habeas corpus jurisdiction;' 7 the threat of imprisonment where a
fine has been imposed may be sufficiently remote from the original crime
so as to vitiate the threat of imprisonment.
The district court's ruling that petitioner Steven Wright's suspended
sentence and probation for one year for unlawfully resisting arrest satisfied
the custody requirement was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit without elabo-
ration.'8 Nevertheless, the acceptance by the Fourth Circuit of this deter-
12 Id.
" Id. at 738. The charges against petitioners resulted from a bar room altercation. Id. at
739.
" See note 3 supra.
'* Brief for Petitioners at 9.
* Brief for Appellees at 10. See VA. CODE § 19.2-358 (Cum. Supp. 1977) for the procedure
on default in payment of fine.
'1 544 F.2d at 739. The Ninth Circuit, in Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975), reasoned that imposition of a fine alone did not satisfy
the custody requirement of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
[A] threat of incarceration is implicit in a court-imposed fine, for jail is one of the
sanctions by which courts enforce their judgements and orders. Hence a fine may
in some circumstances ultimately prove to be the price of freedom. But until con-
finement is imminent . . . the 'special urgency' justifying use of the habeas corpus
remedy is notably absent.
509 F.2d at 41. Accord, Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1976) (mere $25 fine
does not constitute "custody"); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1970) (fine and
revocation of driver's license does not constitute "custody"); see Walker v. State, 262 F. Supp.
102 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967) (condi-
tionally suspended 30 days sentence constitutes "custody" for purposes of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction).
,1 544 F.2d at 739.
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mination was sound in view of the judicial expansion of the custody con-
cept, 9 and of the Virginia statutes concerning revocation of suspended
sentences and probation." Moreover, the probationary period alone entails
civil liabilities which were recognized by the Supreme Court in Hensley v.
Municipal Court" as constituting "custody sufficient to support indepen-
dently jurisdiction of a petition for a writ of habeas, corpus".22 Under the
Virginia Code, the suspended sentence and probation could be revoked at
any time during the probationary period.Y The probationer, Steven
Wright, could be taken into immediate custody if it appeared to the revo-
cation board that incarceration would likely follow the revocation hear-
ing.2 Thus, the threat of Steven Wright's immediate physical restraint was
sufficient to place him in "custody" within the meaning of the federal
habeas corpus statute.
2 5
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the district court had jurisdic-
tion to review petitioner Steven Wright's conviction for resisting arrest and
petitioner Clarence Wright's convictions for assault and battery upon a
police officer and resisting arrest, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of relief. 2 The petitioners were arrested under the Virginia
disorderly conduct statute which was held to be unconstitutional two
years after the arrest.Y The petitioners asserted that Steven Wright's arrest
" See note 3 supra. See generally Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus: State Prisoners and
the Concept of Custody, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1969).
2 VA. CODE §§ 19.2-306 (Repl. Vol. 1975), 53-290.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
2 See note 9 supra. The civil liabilities referred to by the Hensley Court were the restric-
tions placed on the petitioner's movement, the swiftness with which his "freedom" could be
ended, and the fact that violation of the conditions of his release would constitute a criminal
offense. 411 U.S. at 351. Similarly, VA. CODE § 53-272 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides that the
court may impose probation on the defendant "for such time and under such conditions of
probation as the court shall determine."
Z VA. CODE § 19.2-306 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
The court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient which occurred at any time
within the probation period, . . revoke the suspension of sentence and any proba-
tion, . . . and cause the defendant to be arrested and brought before the court at
any time within one year after the probation period, . . . whereupon, in case the
imposition of sentence has been suspended, the court may pronounce whatever
sentence might have been originally imposed.
21 VA. CODE § 53-250 (Cum. Supp. 1977) authorizes probation officers to arrest and
confine defendant for violation of the terms of their probation or suspended sentences, pend-
ing a hearing by the Board or court to determine whether revocation of probation or the
suspended sentence is appropriate. VA. CODE § 53-278.5 (Repl. Vol. 1974) permits probation
officers to arrest a probationer without a warrant when in an officer's judgment the terms of
the probation have been violated. Due process requires that a probationer receive a judicial
hearing when the suspension of his sentence is revoked, but a summary hearing is sufficient.
Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479 (1946).
1 ee note 22 supra.
2 544 F.2d at 742.
2 VA. CODE § 18.1-253.2 (1950) (repealed 1975).
21 Squire v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). Squire was decided in August 1974, and the trial of the petition-
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was unlawful; thus, Steven Wright legally used force to resist the arrest29
and his brother Clarence Wright legally assisted him." However, at the
time the arrest was made, the statute appeared valid.
Although the petitioners asserted their actions were within their com-
mon law right to resist an unlawful arrest,3 no such right exists when an
arrest is authorized by an apparently valid statute, even though that stat-
ute is later declared unconstitutional.3 2 The overriding policy consideration
supporting this exception to the common law is that the validity of a
statute should be tested only in a court of law.13 Also, persons resisting
arrest should not be excused for their resistance when they successfully
challenge the validity of the statute under which they were arrested.u
Thus, the Fourth Circuit properly held the petitioners' contention to be
without merit.
In addition to the custody requirement of habeas corpus jurisdiction,
available state remedies must be exhausted before a federal court can
consider a writ of habeas corpus. 6 The exhaustion requirement allows
states an opportunity to review state court consideration of federal rights.
37
ers occurred in June 1972. The Squire court found the Virginia disorderly conduct statute to
be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 380 F. Supp. at 280.
2' The common law right to resist unlawful arrest is derived from the concept that
assertion of arbitrary authority is a provocation to resist. See, Chevigny, The Right to Resist
an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128, 1132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Chevigny]. Virginia
has not judicially or legislatively abandoned the common law right to resist unlawful arrest.
544 F.2d at 740 n.4.
- The issue whether a third party may assist a person being illegally arrested was re-
solved by the Missouri Court of Appeals when it held that a third party "may not interfere
with an arrest, even if such arrest is illegal, so long as the police are not using unreasonable
or unnecessary force which would result in serious injury to the arrestee." City of St. Louis
v. Treece, 502 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). For a discussion of Treece, see 18 ST.
Louis L. J. 283 (1973).
' See note 29 supra.
544 F.2d at 740; see Chevigny, supra note 29, at 1131; Note, Defiance of Unlawful
Authority, 83 HARV. L. REV. 626, 636 (1970).
13 State v. Briggs, 435 S.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Mo. 1968).
• Id. at 365.
Although the Wright opinion indicates the Fourth Circuit's general disapproval of the
common law right to resist unlawful arrest, see 544 F.2d at 740 n.4, federal courts will adopt
state court recognition of the common law right. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §
52 (3d ed. 1976).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1970). Section 2254(b) provides that a writ of habeas corpus
will not be granted unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies, or circum-
stances were such as to render the state process ineffective to protect the prisoner's rights.
Section 2254(c) provides that petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies if he has
not availed himself of his right under state law to raise the constitutional question by any
available procedure. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461 (1960).
11 Developments, supra note 5, at 1093-94. Applying Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
the Fourth Circuit has held exhaustion to be a doctrine of comity, and not a definition of
power. Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936, 940 (4th Cir. 1964); see note 5 supra. The Fourth
Circuit has noted that not only the comity concept, but the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1970) requires that the state be given a fair opportunity "by any available procedure" to
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However, exhaustion of state remedies is not required where the state
process is either not available or "ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner."" In two recent cases, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
petitioners' pursuit of relief in state courts would be futile. In Patterson v.
Leeke," the court of appeals held that South Carolina's post-conviction
relief statute0 provides an available remedy which necessarily must be
exhausted by petitioners before federal courts can consider their habeas
corpus claims.4'
The petitioners 2 in Patterson contended that they were denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial because their attorneys failed to advise them
of their rights to appeal their convictions to the South Carolina Supreme
Court.4 3 Because they were not advised of this right, petitioners failed to
file timely notices of appeal and were precluded from obtaining direct
appeals to the South Carolina Supreme Court." Consequently, the South
Carolina Post-Conviction Relief Act provided the only procedure by which
the petitioners could challenge their convictions. 5 Petitioners claimed that
consider assertions of the petitioner and provide relief when deserved. Durkin v. Davis, 538
F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976). Until the state is afforded this opportunity, federal courts
should refrain from granting habeas relief. Id.; see Fourth Circuit Review, Federal Habeas
Corpus Relief for State Prisoners, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 625, 632-34 (1977).
s See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). The statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970)
codifies the futility doctrine, thereby allowing petitioners access to the federal courts, al-
though state remedies may be procedurally adequate, if it appears almost certain that state
courts will rule adversely to petitioner's substantive claims. Developments, supra note 5, at
1098-1100. The futility doctrine does not greatly extend the Supreme Court's ruling that the
habeas corpus petitioner has to present his claim only once to the state's highest court. Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
556 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1977).
4 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. CODE §§ 17-601 to 17-612 (1962) (current
version at S.C. CODE §§ 17-27-10, 17-27-120 (1976).
" 556 F.2d at 1173.
The Fourth Circuit consolidated the claims often habeas corpus petitioners for resolu-
tion in Patterson. 556 F.2d at 1168.
1 For a discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see text accompanying
notes 71-114 infra.
11 In South Carolina, the appellant or his attorney has ten days after receiving written
notice of judgment to give notice to the opposite party of an intent to appeal to the Supreme
court. S.C. CODE § 17-405 (1962) (current version at S.C. CODE § 18-9-60 (1976)). Unless notice
of appeal is given and timely served, the South Carolina Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
over the appeal. White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). The requirement that
notice of intent to appeal is given within a statutorily prescribed time is based on the interest
of terminating litigation promptly to ensure judicial efficiency. See Note, Failure to File
Timely Notice of Appeal in Criminal Cases: Excusable Neglect, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 73, 73
(1965).
1 The South Carolina Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act "is not a substitute for
nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review
of the sentence or conviction." S.C. CODE § 17-601 (b) (1962) (current version at S.C. CODE §
17-27-20(b) (1976)). Most states limit post-conviction relief by not allowing a prisoner to use
the procedure to raise all issues that could have been presented on direct appeal. See Note,
The North Carolina -Post-Conviction Hearing Act: A Procedural Snare, 55 N.C.L. REv. 653,
659-60 (1977).
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unlike direct appeals, all alleged trial errors, such as insufficiency of the
evidence supporting the conviction, would not be considered through the
post-conviction procedure." Thus, petitioners contended that exhaustion
of state remedies would be futile, and that they should be allowed to forego
the state proceedings and pursue their constitutional claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the federal courts."
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court might not consider all
trial errors alleged by the petitioners,48 application for relief under the
statute would not necessarily be futile. In two post-conviction appeals, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that where failure to per-
fect an appeal resulted from neglect of counsel, all alleged trial errors
would be considered by the state Supreme Court. 9 Therefore, petitioners
could be granted relief as a result of any of the alleged trial errors. The
uncertainty of the outcome of the state court proceedings creates the ne-
cessity for petitioners to exhaust their available state remediesA Thus, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the South Carolina courts should have an
opportunity to adjudicate fully petitioners' claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel before the federal court exercises its jurisdiction. The decision
was a sound applicaton of the doctrine of federal-state comity, which re-
quires that the state courts have a fair opportunity to consider petitioners'
46 The Patterson petitioners cited the South Carolina Supreme Court decision of Sim-
mons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975), as support for their argument that all
alleged trial errors would not be considered in the post-conviction process. The record indi-
cated that Simmons' attorney had neglected to file a notice of intent to appeal within the
required ten day period. See note 44 supra. The South Crolina Supreme Court affirmed the
state circuit court's denial of the application for post-conviction relief on the basis that the
trial errors raised could only be properly considered on direct appeal. 264 S.C. at 423, 215
S.E.2d at 885. The Fourth Circuit in Patterson distinguished Simmons, stating that the
petitioner Simmons did not allege, nor did the lower court find that the failure to give timely
notice of a direct appeal was a result of the neglect of counsel to advise Simmons of his right
to a direct appeal. 556 F.2d at 1172. For a discussion of Simmons, see 28 S.C.L. Rav. 302
(1976).
'T 556 F.2d at 1171.
See 28 S.C.L. REV. 302, 304-07 (1976). In White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35
(1974), the petitioner alleged in his application for post-conviction relief that counsel had
failed to inform petitioner of his right to appeal, and thus he was denied effective assistance
of counsel. In denying petitioner's appeal from the post-conviction relief order, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found petitioner's criminal record made it almost impossible to
believe he was not aware of his right to appeal. Moreover, "in the absence of any showing of
prejudice to the defendant," failing to be informed of his right to appeal is not grounds for a
new trial. 263 S.C. at 119, 208 S.E.2d at 39. For a discussion of White, see 27 S.C.L. REV.
380 (1976).
11 DeLee v. Knight, 266 S.C. 103, 221 S.E.2d 844, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 939 (1976); Gore
v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973). Although the petitioner in DeLee gave timely
notice of intent to appeal, he failed to perfect his appeal within 210 days. 266 S.C. at 107,
221 S.E.2d at 845. The trial court found that the failure to perfect the appeal within the
statutory time limits was the result of counsel's neglect. Id.
I See Documentary Supplement, State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas
Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 149, 151-59 (1971).
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claims and provide relief before federal courts exercise habeas corpus juris-
diction.5'
The Fourth Circuit also resolved Franklin v. Conway" by applying the
doctrine of federal-state comity. The petitioner asserted that the Virginia
Code section dealing with possession of burglary tools53 was invalid, be-
cause it creates a presumption" of intent to commit larceny and thus
denies due process of law. 5 The due process assertion had not been raised
in the state post-conviction process, and therefore, the federal court de-
ferred the exercise of its jurisdiction to allow a state court determination
of the statute's constitutional validity."
The Virginia Supreme Court had upheld the validity of the statute in
two earlier cases.57 Relying upon an earlier Supreme Court precedent,58 the
1, See notes 5, 37 supra.
52 546 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1976).
'3 VA. CODE § 18.2-94 (1950) provides in pertinent part:
The possession of such burglarious tools, implements or outfit by any person other
than a licensed dealer, shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to commit bur-
glary, robbery or larceny.
Id.
11 Under the Thayer theory of presumptions, a presumption shifts the burden of produc-
ing evidence on an issue from the party having the burden of persuasion on that issue to his
opponent. See J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 337 (1896). See also Ashford &
Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L. J. 165, 172-73 (1969); Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of
Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1954). Another view of presumptions, known as the
Morgan approach, not only places the burden of introducing evidence on the opponent of the
presumption, but also shifts the burden of persuasion to that party. See E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 33-35 (1954). The federal district court of Virginia has held that
Virginia's burglarious tools statute codifies a Thayer-type presumption. Richards v. Cox, 303
F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va. 1969).
Statutory presumptions are usually enacted by legislatures as a method of facilitating
the establishment of a particular element of a crime. See Note, Constitutionality of Rebutta-
ble Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. R~v. 527, 544 (1955). The use of statutory presump-
tions is subject to constitutional limits because of possible adverse effects on criminal defen-
dants. Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial Sleight of Hand, 53 VA. L. REv. 702,
706 (1967). Mr. Justice Black has argued that the utilization of statutory criminal presump-
tions dilute, if not eliminate, eight constitutional rights of a defendant:
1. His right not to be compelled to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury;
2. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
3. The right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself;
4. The right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law;
5. The right to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
6. The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for his defense;
7. The right to counsel; and
8. The right to trial by an impartial jury.
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Justice Black's position, see Fuller & Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutory
Presumptions that Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 420 (1971).
" 546 F.2d at 581.
7 Nance v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 428, 124 S.E.2d 900 (1962); Burnette v. Common-
1978]
572 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Virginia court construed the burglarious tool statute as meeting the
"rational connection" test. 9 A rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed indicates a statutory presumption may be
constitutional." The Virginia court has also found that the presumption
of intent to burglarize could be rebutted by the defendant's reasonable
explanation of his possession of the burglarious tools.8 ' However, the Su-
preme Court decision relied upon by the Virginia Supreme Court arguably
has been altered by later Supreme Court decisions."2 The Supreme Court
strengthened the requirements of the rational connection test in Leary v.
United States, " by holding that in order to satisfy the test the correlation
between the basic and presumed facts must be at least more likely than
not. 4 Thus, the Fourth Circuit denied relief because the state court should
have an opportunity to consider the statute in light of more recent Su-
preme Court decisions. Furthermore, the statutory construction of a state
statute is more appropriately determined by courts of that state.
When the issue is raised the Virginia Supreme Court should find the
wealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953). The Burnette court recognized that burglarious
tools are usually designed and manufactured for lawful purposes. However, mere possession
of the tools themselves does not constitute a violation of the statute; rather, the possession
of the tools with the intent to use them in commission of a crime constitutes a violation. 194
Va. at 790, 75 S.E.2d at 487. The Nance court ruled that a person in possession of burglarious
tools, other than a licensed dealer, has the burden of making a reasonable explanation for
his possession of the tools in order to overcome the statutory presumption against him. 203
Va. at 432, 124 S.E.2d at 904.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953).
6 See Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions And The Reasonable Doubt Stan-
dard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 223, 235-38 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Presumptions]. The Supreme Court in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943),
ruled:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the
inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience.
Id. at 467-68.
" See Nance v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 428, 432, 124 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1962). The Nance
court held that once possession is proven, the burden of presenting evidence to rebut the
presumption of intent to burglarize is on the defendant, but the burden of ultimate proof does
not shift, nor deprive the defendant of his right to have the jury instructed on the presumption
of innocence. Id.
62 Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973) (presumption meeting both
reasonable-doubt standard and more-likely-than-not standard satisfies due process); Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); see Presumption, supra note 60, at 237-38 n.93.
63 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
'4 Id. at 36. See Presumptions, supra note 60, at 237-38. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975) (ultimate burden of proof can not be shifted to the defendant).
11 546 F.2d at 581. For the expectation of an adverse ruling by a state court in an area of
substantive law to be strong enough to allow bypass of the exhaustion requirement, there
usually must be only a short period of time between the controlling prior decision and peti-
tioner's claim, indication by the state courts of their inability to change the prior ruling, or
repeated adverse determinations by the state courts. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1099.
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burglarious tools statute to be unconstitutional. The rational connection
test, as set forth in Leary, may not be satisfied by the Virginia statute."
The basic fact is the possession of the tools, and the presumed fact is the
intent to use them to commit a crime. 7 Virginia has recognized that these
tools are usually designed and manufactured for lawful purposes." Thus,
the Leary requirement that the correlation between the basic and pre-
sumed facts being more likely rationally connected than not apparently
could not be satisfied.
6 9
Once a federal court has determined that jurisdictional requirements
such as "custody" and exhaustion of state remedies have been satisfied,
the federal court may examine proper substantive grounds for habeas cor-
pus relief in order to prevent restraint in violation of petitioners' federal
constitutional rights." One such right guaranteed under the constitution
is that criminal defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel .
7
In Marzullo v. State,7 the Fourth Circuit considered a petition alleging
that the petitioner had been denied effective assistance of counsel. For-
merly, in cases involving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Fourth Circuit evaluated attorney conduct by applying the "farce and
mockery of justice" test73 which requires a subjective inquiry into whether
counsel was so obviously inadequate as to make a farce of the trial.7 4 The
Marzullo court expressly rejected this test,75 however, and adopted the
" See text accompanying notes 63, 64 supra.
See Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953).
" Id.; see note 57 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 63, 64 supra.
° See Developments, supra note 5, at 1040.
7, U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. The sixth amendment right to counsel has been held to apply
to the states through the fourteenth amendment in all felony prosecutions. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This right was later extended to all criminal prosecutions,
including misdemeanors, where the possibility of imprisonment exists. See Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 40 (1972). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
address the ineffective assistance of counsel problem. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 54 (1970). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that the right to effective counsel
is implicit in the sixth amendment right to counsel. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970). Although the present judicial trend is to view the right to effective assistance
of counsel as a sixth amendment right, this right has also been derived solely from due process
considerations. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; see Note, Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in Transition, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 509 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Transitioni; The ineffectiveness of counsel is usually raised in collateral
attacks upon convictions, and these collateral attacks are usually in the form of applications
for writs of habeas corpus. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 290 n.7 (1964).
72 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977).
= The "farce and mockery of justice" test was approved by the Fourth Circuit in Root
v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1965) (affirming district court's ruling that counsel
was effective). This standard is derived from the fifth amendment due process guarantee to
a fair trial. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
7' See generally Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bines].
7- The Fourth Circuit appears formerly to have been inconsistent in applying standards
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"normal competency" standard." This standard requires that counsel's
advice must be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases" in order to be considered effective assistance.
7
Petitioner Marzullo had been separately indicted for two different
rapes. His habeas corpus petition alleged that he had been represented
inadequately by appointed counsel.7 8 Of the alleged deficiencies, the
Fourth Circuit found that the allegation that counsel was ineffective in the
jury selection process determined petitioner's right to habeas relief. 7 The
prosecuting witness in the first rape case told the judge in the presence of
for determining effective assistance of counsel. Compare Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (implicit acceptance of an objective standard by
setting out specific minimal requirements for counsel's conduct) with Bennett v. State, 425
F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 881 (1970) (applying the farce and mockery of
justice test). See note 77 infra.
7' The "normal competency" standard was derived from Supreme Court dicta in
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the
McMann defendant was not entitled to a habeas hearing where his guilty plea was based on
competent advice, and he alleged the guilty plea was a product of a prior coerced confession.
Id. at 771. The Supreme Court reemphasized its McMann dicta in Tollet v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973). The Tollet Court held that where a state criminal pleads guilty on
advice of counsel, he can only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea
by showing counsel's advice did not meet the attorney competency standards of McMann.
Id. at 266.
" McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). The Fourth Circuit in Marzullo
noted that it would "adhere" to the following description of the normal competency standard
of certain aspects of counsel's assistance set forth in dicta in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,
226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). There the court stated:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must
confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him
of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses
are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself
enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.
389 F.2d at 226.
11 561 F.2d at 545. The Fourth Circuit has noted that the "farce and mockery of justice"
standard was particularly applicable where the defendant chose and employed his own coun-
sel. Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1965). Most circuits do not distinguish
between appointed counsel and retained counsel when determining counsel's effectiveness
because criminal defendants cannot realistically judge the competence of their attorney prior
to trial. See, e.g., Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 357 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) (retained
counsel effectively assisted); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 351 n.63 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1974) (no evidence that attorney disloyal to defendant); United
States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1193 (9th Cir. 1973) (although counsel retained, prisoner
can assert ineffective assistance of counsel); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d
Cir. 1970) (indigent entitled to same level of legal service as fee-paying client); Ellis v. State,
430 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970) ("farce and mockery of
justice" test applicable to both appointed and retained counsel); Porter v. United States, 298
F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962) (defendant assured effective assistance of counsel whether
attorney is retained or court appointed); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir.
1954) (immaterial whether counsel is court appointed or retained).
1g 561 F.2d at 545.
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the jurors that she could not identify Marzullo as her attacker because she
had not seen his face."° The prosecutor replied that she had previously
identified Marzullo. The case was subsequently dismissed with the consent
of the state'
Marzullo was then arraigned on the second indictment and pleaded not
guilty before the same jurors who were present during the trial for the first
rape charge. Only nineteen jurors were present at this proceeding, and the
court noted that this was an insufficient number of jurors to allow the
twenty peremptory challenges to which Marzullo was entitled under Mary-
land law.82 Marzullo's attorney told the court that twelve jurors could be
chosen even with the challenges." A jury was chosen from the nineteen
members of the jury panel and this jury convicted Marzullo of assault with
intent to rape and perverted practices. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
Marzullo's attorney should have moved to exclude the jury while the first
indictment was being dismissed,s and furthermore, that counsel should
have preserved his peremptory challenges instead of relinquishing them
before the voir dire examination. 6 The Fourth Circuit was guided particu-
larly by the ABA Standards Relating to Defense Function stating that
after consultation with his client, counsel has the sole responsibility of jury
selection and other trial motions and tactics." Also, in discharging the
responsibility of jury selection, counsel should prepare himself prior to
trial.8
Proof that Marzullo's counsel was ineffective could have been rebutted
if the state proved that counsel's ineffectiveness had no prejudicial effect
on the trial. 9 The state asserted that Marzullo had waived his right to have
B Id.
I" d.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-201 (1974).
561 F.2d at 545.
The perverted sexual practices statute is codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554.
Allowing the jury to hear information about the first rape charge could only damage
the credibility of Marzullo, and thus this prejudicial information should have been kept from
the jury. 561 F.2d at 546.
"Id.
ABA Standards Relating to Defense Function § 5-2(b) (App. Draft 1971) provides:
The decisions on ... what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be
made, and all other strategies and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of
the lawyer after consultation with his client.
Id. at § 7.2(a).
The burden of proving habeas corpus allegations or other collateral allegations for post-
conviction relief is always on the defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244, 2255 (1971). If the
defendant proves that counsel's assistance was ineffective, the Fourth Circuit addresses the
further question of whether the mistakes of counsel were so prejudicial to the accused as to
justify remand or reversal of the case. The Fourth Circuit places the burden on the state to
show that prejudice did not result from defense counsel's ineffectiveness. Coles v. Peyton, 389
F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). The Fourth Circuit in Coles stated
that counsel's failure to meet the objective standard of competency automatically constituted
a denial of effective assistance, "unless the state, on which is cast the burden of proof once a
violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby." 389 F.2d at 226;
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the first indictment conducted in the absence of the jury. A waiver must
be knowing and intelligent; since there was no proof that Marzullo knew
his rights, the state could not meet its burden of proof." The state also
alleged that defense counsel's decision not to challenge the jury was a trial
tactic, but the record clearly refuted this assertion. 2 Thus, the state failed
to rebut defendant's proof that he had been denied effective assistance of
counsel.
To begin its analysis in Marzullo, the Fourth Circuit established the
"normal competency" test as the controlling standard for determining
whether counsel's assistance has been effective. 3 Adoption of this test
brings the Fourth Circuit into harmony with the majority of circuits adopt-
ing more objective standards. 4 The Supreme Court's decision to make the
sixth amendment applicable to the states" has destroyed the legal and
practical basis of the "farce and mockery of justice" standard. 6 No longer
is the fifth amendment due process approach exemplified in the "farce and
mockery of justice" standard appropriate; the sixth amendment more spe-
cifically focuses on the "assistance of counsel."97 Although valid convic-
cf. Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967) (burden on state to prove lack of prejudice
when counsel unprepared as a result of late appointment); Martin v. Commonwealth, 365
F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966) (prejudice resulting from ineffectiveness of counsel is matter for
district judge as trier of fact in post-conviction relief proceeding).
561 F.2d at 546.
" Waiver has been defined as the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). In applying Johnson,
the Supreme Court has not always insisted that the relinquishment of the right be intentional
or that the right be known to the defendant. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
(defendant's failure to make timely objection at trial held sufficient evidence upon which to
infer waiver); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (prisoner's failure to make timely
objection to grand jury composition precluded a post-conviction challenge of the same grand
jury five years later); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (no evidence of defendant's
intent to relinquish right to be indicted by properly selected grand jury; court held right
waived); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (defendant asserted guilty plea was to
avoid death penalty that was later held unconstitutional; court held waiver of challenge
existed). But see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (competent legal counsel must
be present before rights can be waived); Boykin v. State, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (requiring
express warning that certain rights are about to be waived).
92 561 F.2d at 546. The defense attorney also testified that he remembered the jury to be
absent when prosecuting witness in first indictment said she could not identify Marzullo. The
record indicates the attorney was incorrect. Id. at 547.
'" See note 76 supra.
" See United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-67 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Twomey,
510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d
125, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1974); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970). But see Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1655) (applying the "farce and mockery
of justice" test); United States v. Jones, 512 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1975); Dunker v. Vinzant,
505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975); Lorraine v. United States,
444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1971).
g Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
96 See Transition, supra note 71, at 550-51.
U See note 71 supra.
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tions may be lost and courts' efficiency impeded," the Supreme Court has
indicated that defendants' sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel should be fully protected.9
The Fourth Circuit also has applied the "normal competency" stan-
dard subsequent to Marzullo in Tolliver v. United States.",° The Fourth
Circuit held defendant Tolliver's guilty plea to be invalid as a result of the
ineffective assistance of counsel.'0' Tolliver had been persuaded by his
lawyers to plead guilty to a charge of conspiracy to manufacture phencycli-
dine, a controlled substance.' ° He was advised that in return for his guilty
plea another charge would be dropped and the government would not seek
the "double penalty" allowed by statute.' 3 In convincing him to plead
guilty, Tolliver was advised by his attorneys that his trial testimony could
be impeached by use of his prior convictions, possibly increasing his pun-
ishment upon conviction."'°
Tolliver's prior convictions, however, were for violations of the Mari-
juana Tax Transfer Act"5 and were possibly no longer valid. The Supreme
Court in Leary v. United States"' held any payment of the tax under the
Act to be incriminating, and thus, in violation of the fifth amendment. 07
After Leary, timely assertion of the fifth amendment privilege would bar
prosecution for violation of the Act."8 Although Tolliver's convictions pre-
dated Leary, the Leary decision could have been determinative because
" One commentator argues that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
presents unique problems for the trial court in its attempt to control ineffective representa-
tion. Bines, supra note 74, at 943. Usually a state can adhere to a constitutional standard by
intervention of the trial judge or prosecutor, but controlling counsel's ineffectiveness is almost
impossible. Id. at 944. Regardless of the competence of the prosecutor or reliability of the
trial's result, "every instance of ineffectiveness is potentially a lost conviction." Id., see
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1973).
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963).
563 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1977).
202 Id. at 1121.
'° A controlled substance is a drug or other substance for which the federal government
has deemed necessary the control of its illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and
possession and improper use. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1970).
,03 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1970). The maximum penalty for a first offense for
possession of a controlled substance is 5 years and $15,000. The punishment can be doubled
if there has been a previous conviction. Id.
01 563 F.2d at 1119.
205 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (repealed 1970). This section of the Marijuana Transfer Act made
it unlawful for the transferee of marijuana not to pay the transfer tax imposed by 26 U.S.C.
§ 4741(a) (repealed 1970). By paying the tax, an individual was required to submit certain
information that identified the individual and associated him with possession of marijuana.
Id. Upon receipt of this information the Internal Revenue Service could forward copies to
state and local law enforcement agencies on request. 563 F.2d 1119-20 n.5. Thus, by paying
the tax, the individual may have subjected himself to prosecution for violation of state and
local drug laws. Id.
01 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
107 See id. at 52.
"I0 See note 105 supra.
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many courts applied it retroactively.' 9 Tolliver had inquired whether
Leary would have an effect on his prior convictions, but his attorneys
assured him the convictions were valid.' The Fourth Circuit's holding in
Tolliver, however, did not go so far as to require counsels' knowledge of
Leary and its effect on the defendant's prior convictions. The holding was
based on the attorneys' failure to learn more of the facts and law support-
ing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea before the imposition of the
sentence even though Tolliver had notified his attorneys that Leary may
have invalidated his convictions for violations of the Marijuana Tax Trans-
fer Act."'
The Fourth Circuit's adoption of the "normal competency" standard
demonstrates its interest in the rights of the accused as opposed to the
more practical interest of judicial expediency."' The court has not, how-
ever, imposed a standard of competency on attorneys requiring them to be
infallible in their representation, which might result in many lost convic-
tions."' Rather, the Fourth Circuit has attempted to reconcile defendants'
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel with public inter-
est in the preservation of validly obtained convictions." 4
Another substantive determination concerning federal habeas corpus
relief made by the Fourth Circuit was directed toward the constitutionality
of a contempt of court conviction." 5 The power to punish contempt is
"' See, e.g., United States v. Liguori, 430 F.2d 842, 846 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 990 (1971). The retroactive effect of any new constitutional decision is determined by
three factors. See Bines, supra note 74 at 956-58. First, the greater the effect on the guilt-
determining process, the greater the likelihood of retroactive application. Secondly, the de-
gree and justifiability of state reliance on the previous rule is a factor. If decisions tend toward
change in the rule, then there is an increased likelihood of retroactive application. Finally, if
the first two factors are indeterminate, the deciding factor is the impact of retroactivity on
the administration of justice. Id.
11 563 F.2d at 1119.
Id. at 1120-21.
,,Z See Transition, supra note 71, at 551.
,, See Bines, supra note 74, at 943-44.
", Commentators have suggested that the harmless error test could best preserve validly
obtained convictions while protecting the sixth amendment rights of defendants. See Transi-
tion, supra note 71, at 552. The Supreme Court formulated a harmless-constitutional-error
rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The constitutional error must be shown
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, with the burden of proof on the beneficiary of the
error, before the challenged judgment is valid. Id. at 24. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970) provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
FED. R. CrM. P. 52(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
"1 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none others, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration of justice; ...
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inherent in the court and the existence of the power is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings."' In Paul v. Pleasants, 1 1 7 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on any
of the petitioner's assertions. Jerry Paul, the petitioner, was the defense
counsel for Joan Little, who was acquitted of murdering a prison guard in
a much publicized trial."' Paul, who had been found in contempt of court
for his conduct during the trial, first contended that his conduct did not
constitute contempt and was constitutionally protected."' The Fourth Cir-
cuit examined the record and found Paul's conduct surpassed the bounds
of zealous advocacy. Paul's turning his back to the court and addressing
the news media in a loud disrespectful voice was viewed by the court as
particularly contemptuous.'20 The Supreme Court has expressly con-
demned conduct of this nature. 2 '
Paul contended alternatively that although his conduct might have
been contemptuous, his right to due process was violated because he was
given neither adequate notice of the charges against him, nor afforded an
opportunity to be heard prior to his sentencing. ' Paul also asserted that
For a general history of the contempt power, see J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
(1927).
"I See Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power And The Constitution: The View From
Without And Within, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 34, 36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sedler].
117 551 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1977) (No. 76-
1838).
"' See, e.g., Footlick & Smith, Defending Joan Little, Newsweek, July 28, 1975 at 34;
Reston, Joan Little Case, N.Y. Times Mag., April 6, 1975 at 38; Case of Rape or Seduction:
Joan Little Case, Time, July 28, 1975 at 49.
"' Paul claimed that his vigorous advocacy was protected under the First, Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 551 F.2d at 578. A lawyer
has a duty to be a vigorous advocate as stated by ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIMITY,
Disciplinary Rule 7-101. However, the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTING FUNc-
TION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971) provides in pertinent part:
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to engage in behavior or tactics purposedly
calculated to irritate or annoy the court or the prosecutor. Id.
at 7-1 (c).
The Commentary to 7-1 observes:
A reasonable balance must be reached on matters of conduct so that judicial pro-
ceedings are not permitted to degenerate to the level of street brawls, but it is
important that no artificial standards of court room conduct impede the advocates
from performing their legitimate function so as to preclude vigorous advocacy of
their viewpoints on legal questions, and the zealous advancement of their side of
the case ...Of necessity, the lawyer must often be forceful and vigorous in his
questioning of the witness and his argument to the jury. This does not mean,
however, that he may make a farce of the trial or undermine the dignity of the legal
process by excessive histrionics ....
Id. at Commentary to paragraph 7-1(c).
,22 551 F.2d at 578.
1 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 5 (1952). See generally, Gilmore, Professional
Responsibility Problems and Contempt in Advocacy, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 288 (1975).
'n Although petitioner asserted that he was deprived of his fifth amendment due process
rights, FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) provides in pertinent part:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw
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when a direct contempt occurs in the presence of the court and the order
is not entered until the conclusion of the trial, due process requires that a
hearing be held prior to the determination of contempt. 23 The final conten-
tion of Paul was that he and the trial judge had become "embroiled" in
controversy; thus the trial judge should have disqualified himself.'
24
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v.
Hayes, '2' in resolving the assertions of the petitioner. The Taylor Court
held that where the judge postpones a contempt citation until after the
trial, due process requires that "reasonable notice of the specific charges
and opportunity to be heard" be given to the defendant. 2 The Supreme
Court in Taylor also held that when a judge becomes "embroiled in a
running controversy" with an attorney, the judge should disqualify himself
from disposing of contempt charges.1
2
1
The Fourth Circuit held that the facts clearly established that Paul was
accorded due process within the holding of Taylor. As in Taylor, the Paul
judge did not proceed summarily with the contempt charges, but delayed
his actions until the end of the trial. 2 Petitioner was advised on July 21,
1975 that he would be cited for contempt following the jury verdict, and
on August 12, 1975 he was told that the court would hear a statement from
him following the jury charge. 29 On August 15, 1975 the court gave Paul
two opportunities to address the contempt charge and at neither hearing
did he deny the validity of the charges.' Consequently, Paul's claims
regarding notice and hearing of the contempt charges were without merit.
The Supreme Court found that the judge in Taylor became prejudiced
against the attorney as a result of the alleged contemnable facts, and thus
the judge should have disqualified himself. 3' In contrast, the record indi-
or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court.
The Supreme Court in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), held that a trial judge could
defer judgment until the completion of the trial without losing the power to summarily punish
the contempt under FED. R. CRiM. P. 42(a). Some commentators have been very critical of
the summary contempt power because of the potential for judicial abuse of this power. See
Sedler, supra note 116, at 85-91.
'1 551 F.2d at 579.
I1 Id.
' 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
, ' Id. at 499. When the contempt action is delayed, the contemnor is allowed to be heard
in his own defense because the justification of "necessity" for a summary action carries much
less weight. Id. at 497-98. The Taylor Court also noted that a full-scale hearing was required
where the conduct did not occur in the court's presence. Id. at 500-01 n.9. For a discussion of
Taylor, see Sedler, supra note 116, at 63-84 (the author, Robert Allen Sedler, was counsel for
petitioner in Taylor).
'" The Supreme Court has held that a trial judge who has become "embroiled" in
controversy with the alleged contemnor must disqualify himself from proceeding summarily
when he has delayed the contempt actions. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
"' 551 F.2d at 577.
129 Id.
13 Id.
"1 418 U.S. at 503 n.10. In Taylor, the judge's words and conduct were set out at length
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cates that the judge in Paul maintained his impartiality throughout the
trial. Moreover, the trial judge commended Paul publicly for his trial
efforts and expressly based the contempt finding on the interest of preserv-
ing "court decorum."'3 The Fourth Circuit therefore properly rejected pe-
titioner's assertion that the judge should have disqualified himself.
If a prisoner's constitutional right to avoid double jeopardy has been
violated, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.'33 The prohibition against
double jeopardy arises from both the policy that a person should not be
punished more than once for the same offense, as well as the consideration
that it would be improper to harass an individual by repeated prosecution
for a single offense." 4 In the recent case of Midgett v. McClelland,'35 the
Fourth Circuit was presented with issues concerning double jeopardy and
due process. At his first trial, petitioner Midgett was convicted of kidnap-
ping and armed robbery for which he was sentenced 15 and 20 years respec-
tively. The sentences, totalling 35 years, were to be served consecutively. 36
Midgett was subsequently retried because his absence from the courtroom
when the judge received and answered written questions from the jury
constituted a procedural trial error.' Although an assault charge had been
dropped by the prosecution at the end of the first trial,' Midgett was
again charged with assault on retrial.139 Also, new charges of kidnapping'
and conspiracy, as well as the armed robbery charges dropped previously,
were adjudicated at the second trial.' At the second trial, Midgett was
convicted of kidnapping, for which he was sentenced 30 years, conspiracy,
for which he was sentenced 5 years to be served consecutively after his
kidnapping sentence, and assault, for which he was sentenced 5 years to
be served concurrently with his kidnapping conviction.' In reversing the
district court's denial of habeas relief, the Fourth Circuit held petitioner
Midgett's conviction for assault violated the double jeopardy clause of the
in the opinion. Id. at 491-492 n.2, 502. Also, the Court relied on the failure of the judge to
provide a hearing on the contempt charges as showing bias on the part of the judge. Id. at
501-02.
"1 551 F.2d at 579.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, prohibits double jeopardy.
" See Note, Statutory Implementation Of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life For A
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 339-40 (1956).
'= 547 F.2d 1194 (1977).
':' Id. at 1195.
"3 The defendant's constitutional right to be present at every stage of the trial was
violated at his first trial. See Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958) (reversing
the first trial of petitioner).
"1 547 F.2d at 1196.
131 See Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 164 A.2d 526 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853
(1961) (affirming judgment in second trial of petitioner).
" The crimes of kidnapping and false imprisonment were confused in the jury charge
at the first trial. 547 F.2d at 1195. Midgett's motion to dismiss the kidnapping indictment
was sustained by the trial judge upon the condition that a new indictment be sought. Id.
"1 547 F.2d at 1196.
142 These sentences were imposed by a judge who did not try Midgett the first time. Id.
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Constitution.' Additionally, the court held that the increase in Midgett's
sentence on retrial was retaliatory, and thus violated his due process
rights.'"
In Midgett's first trial, the assault charge was dropped by the prosecu-
tion after all testimony had been given.'45 The Supreme Court has held
that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury has been impaneled
and sworn.' Because jeopardy had attached to the assault charge, the
dropping of this charge was the equivalent of an acquittal for purposes of
determining whether Midgett was exposed to double jeopardy."7 Thus,
trying Midgett on the same assault charge at his second trial violated the
double jeopardy clause.'"
The due process question precipitated by the harsher sentence Midgett
received for his second kidnapping conviction was not as readily resolved
as the double jeopardy issue.149 Had the Fourth Circuit held that the sec-
ond indictment for kidnapping charged a greater offense than the first
indictment,' the court would have been required to determine whether
the prosecution had acted vindictively.'' By holding that both indictments
"' The double jeopardy clause was applied to the states by the Supreme Court in Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
24 547 F.2d at 1197.
Although Midgett had served his sentence for assault before the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the instant case, the Fourth Circuit directed that the assault conviction be stricken
because the conviction may have had the effect of increasing the punishment subsequently
imposed upon Midgett for a parole violation in 1975. 547 F.2d at 1196. The assault charge in
Midgett's first trial was not dropped by the prosecution until all testimony had been given.
Id.
14' Krepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904); see Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution
Problem, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1272, 1275-76 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Double Jeopardy]. See
also, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (no retrial or appellant
review when defendant's motion for acquittal granted).
", Double Jeopardy, supra note 146, at 1275.
"' Midgett had served his assault sentence by the time of the second trial. 547 F.2d at
1196.
"' Midgett's motion to dismiss the kidnap indictment in his first trial was granted by
the trial judge on the condition that a new kidnap indictment would be sought. 547 F.2d at
1195. Most circuit courts of appeals have held that the sentencing court's increase of a legally
imposed sentence is barred by the double jeopardy clause. See United States v. Turner, 518
F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975) (no sentence may be increased once service of that sentence has
begun); United States v. Bowens, 514 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1975) (sentence under Youth Correc-
tions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1970), could not be increased after sentence has begun);
Chandler v. United States, 468 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972) (sentence reduced on one count could
not be increased on unchallenged count). Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that
increasing a legally valid sentence after its imposition may be constitutional when the pris-
oner has applied for a review of his sentence. Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176 (4th
Cir. 1972). For a discussion of sentence increases and double jeopardy, see Note, Twice in
Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REv. 325, 334-37 (1977).
" The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the first indictment charged false impris-
onment rather than kidnapping, but the Fourth Circuit held that the first indictment
"clearly" charged kidnapping. 547 F.2d at 1196.
"' The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness in Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The Blackledge rule assures a prisoner of his right to appeal
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were for kidnapping and had equal impact,"2 the Fourth Circuit was pre-
sented with the issue whether the judge acted in a retaliatory manner.'3
In holding that the second sentence violated Midgett's due process
rights, the Fourth Circuit determined that the second sentence was retalia-
tory and thus, impermissable. 54 Petitioner's conviction was prior to North
Carolina v. Pearce,5' a case in which the Supreme Court placed restric-
tions on the resentencing of defendants. Although Pearce does not apply
retroactively, the holding in Pearce is analogous to the Fourth Circuit's
ruling in Midgett. 56
The Pearce Court held that vindictiveness against a defendant arising
because of his successful appeal of his conviction should not be a factor
present in resentencing the defendant.5 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in making the Pearce decision non-retroactive would seem appl-
icable to the due process issue in Midgett. 5 The Supreme Court reasoned
that retroactive application of Pearce could substantially interfere with the
administration of justice because of the difficulty in determining reasons
for sentences imposed in the past. 59 The Fourth Circuit, however, implic-
itly determined the reasons for the sentence, and held the second trial
without fear that the prosecutor will retaliate with a more serious charge if the original
conviction is reversed. Id. at 24-29. Due process requires that a defendant be relieved of
apprehension of retaliatory motivation on the part of the prosecutor, so that defendants will
not be unconstitutionally deterred from exercising their appeal rights. Id. at 28.
252 See note 140 supra.
'= Retaliation by a judge may now be assumed when there is a sentence increase on
retrial. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The basis for this assumption
relates to the judge's position within the justice system. Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial
After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 432-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Aplin]. Judges may resent the defendant who obtains a reversal because the reversal indi-
cates the potential unfairness of the judicial system. Id. at 432. Further, the judge may view
a sentence increase as a method of punishment for a defendant's "unwarranted" appeal, as
well as a way to discourage "unwarranted" appeals by others. Id. at 433.
"1, 547 F.2d at 1197. The Fourth Circuit found the greater sentence impermissable be-
cause "[oin its face, it seems retaliatory." Id.
'- 395 U.S. 711 (1969). When a sentence is increased on retrial the resentencing judge
must affirmatively state his reasons for imposing the harsher sentence. These reasons must
be "based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 726; see
Aplin, supra note 153, at 427-29.
258 The Supreme Court decided in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973), that the Pearce
rule should only be applied prospectively. Id. at 57. For a discussion of Payne, see Recent
Decisions, Criminal Procedure-Resentencing, 40 BRooKLYN L. REV. 786 (1974). On the same
day of the Payne decision, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Chaffin v. Stynch-
combe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). The Supreme Court ruled in Chaffin that the double jeopardy
clause was not violated by jury imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial. If the jury is not
informed of the prior sentence and the defendant fails to show vindictiveness caused the
sentence increase, then the due process clause is not violated. Id. at 24-28; see Recent Cases,
Jury Imposed Harsher Sentence On Retrial Held To Be Constitutional, 78 DICK. L. REV. 597
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Harsher Sentence]; Note, Harsher Sentencing by Jury on Retrial
Is Permissable: Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 28 Sw. L. J. 469 (1974).
' See note 157 supra.
's' Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 36-37 (1973).
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judge's sentence to be retaliatory because he acted vindictively.'60 This
determination appears to shift the burden of proof from the defendant by
requiring the judge to show he did not act vindictively. Such a result would
accord with Pearce. 8, Had the Fourth Circuit placed the burden of showing
judicial vindictiveness on the defendant, as did pre-Pearce cases, the
greater second sentence may have been affirmed.
6 2
In recent cases, the Fourth Circuit has adhered to traditional concepts
limiting the scope of habeas corpus relief, but has also rendered decisions
that may increase its availability. The Fourth Circuit has strictly enforced
the habeas corpus jurisdictional requirements that petitioners be in
"custody"' 8 3 and exhaust available state remedies.' 4 In cases involving the
contempt citation of an attorney'65 and the constitutional validity of a
statute that was the basis of petitioners' arrest,' 6 the Fourth Circuit found
none of the substantive claims merited habeas corpus relief. Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit's recent adoption of an objective standard for determin-
ing the effectiveness of counsel's assistance'67 may increase both the sub-
stantive scope of federal habeas relief and the number of habeas applica-
tions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although this standard may
be a beneficial development, the impact of the Fourth Circuit's adoption
of the standard may not be determined until the court further articulates
criteria outlining minimum requirements for determining the effectiveness
of counsel in future cases. In addition, the Fourth Circuit's decision that
petitioner's harsher sentence at his second trial was impermissable because




Medical Care For The Incarcerated
Modem judicial thought affords prisoners many rights and privileges'
," The dissenting opinion noted that the second trial judge's sentence seemed vindictive
even though the district court had found the facts to work against a presumption of prejudice.
547 F.2d at 1198 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
"' 395 U.S. at 726.
12 In Pearce, the Supreme Court recognized the extreme difficulty of proving the exist-
ence of a retaliatory motivation. 395 U.S. at 725 n.20. See Harsher Sentence, supra note 157,
at 802.
,13 See text accompanying notes 7-35 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 36-69 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 117-132 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 26-35 supra.
"6 See text accompanying notes 71-114 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 133-162 supra.
See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969) (when state prison regulations conflict
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previously unavailable to the incarcerated.' Whereas courts formerly re-
fused to interfere with matters concerning prison administration and regu-
lation,3 today federal courts adjudicate prisoner allegations of constitu-
tional deprivations occuring in state as well as federal penal institutions.4
When officials' violate constitutional or statutory rights of prisoners, courts
grant relief in the form of money damages' as well as injunctive decrees
7
proscribing further violations.8
with paramount constitutional or federal statutory rights, federal courts will intervene and
void those regulations); see, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (regulation barring
media representatives from prison did not violate inmates' freedom of speech due to availabil-
ity of alternative modes of communication); cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)
("Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privi-
leges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.").
2 The Virginia Supreme Court gave the classic characterization of the status of penal
inmates in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), where that court stated
that a prisoner is temporarily the slave of the state. Id. at 796.
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
See note 1 supra.
Typical of those officials against whom suit is brought are the corrections director, e.g.,
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); the state governor, e.g., Houghton v. Shaefer, 392 U.S.
639 (1968); the prison doctor in charge of rendering medical assistance, e.g., Cole v. Williams,
526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1975); the prison guard who has allegedly violated the prisoner's rights,
e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2nd Cir. 1974); the sheriff in charge of the prisoner,
e.g., Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973); and the prison warden, e.g., Tolbert v.
Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970). See note 8 infra.
6 Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified sub nom., Ault v.
Holmes, 506 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1974). The Preston court assessed nominal damages against
the prison warden due to his refusal to mail a prisoner's letter to the prisoner's attorney. See
note 8 infra.
7 Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (court enjoined prison officials from
censoring any of the prisoners' outgoing mail); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.
R.I. 1970) (prison officials enjoined from censoring incoming and outgoing mail between
prisoners and certain public officials); H. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONViCTEn 423 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as KERPER]; see note 8 infra.
When a prisoner litigates the conditions of his confinement, he usually proceeds either
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970). KERPER, supra note 7, at 222. See
Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 ARIz. ST. L. J. 549. Section
1983 provides that any person shall be liable to any party to whom he has caused injury by
depriving that party of constitutional or federal statutory rights while acting under the color
of state "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section
1985(3) imposes liability upon any party to a conspiracy to violate § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1970).
The prisoner challenging prison conditions under § 1983 proceeds in federal court under
the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) which grants original jurisdiction to federal district
courts for civil actions commenced by any person wherein a claim is asserted that that
individual has been deprived of his rights guaranteed protection under § 1983. Stuart v.
Heard, 359 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (federal district court has jurisdiction of any
complaint by state prisoner against his jailers for alleged misconduct or deprivation of rights).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), eliminated possible barriers to the litigation of these
rights presented by state immunity doctrine. In Young, the Supreme Court decreed that state
immunity guaranteed by the eleventh amendment must give way to the supreme law of the
United States as prescribed in the Constitution. Id. at 159-60, 167-68; see Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975) (no absolute immunity of public school board officials from
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In Wester v. Jones,9 the Fourth Circuit examined the extent to which
proper medical care, a right secured by the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment,"0 must be provided to a prisoner in
order to meet the constitutional standard." The issue in the case was
whether a prisoner, who had received a thorough physical examination
that indicated that he was not suffering from the complained of ailment,
had a right to subsequent complete examinations when he returned with
the same complaint. The court held that such later examinations are not
constitutionally mandated.
Wester, a North Carolina state prisoner, petitioned the district court
for relief, 2 alleging he had been denied proper medical care in violation of
his constitutional rights. 3 He contended that this violation resulted from
prosecution for acts undertaken in their role as public school officials).
Certain advantages accrue to the prisoner proceeding under these statutes rather than
seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The primary benefit is that the prisoner need not exhaust
all available state remedies before filing suit in federal court. Compare McCray v. Burrell,
516 F.2d 357, 359-65 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 923 (1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S.
471 (1976) (civil rights proceeding by state prisoner negates necessity of exhaustion of state
remedies before filing in federal court) with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1970) (unless state has no
appropriate remedial procedures or available procedures are ineffective to protect the pris-
oner's rights, a writ of habeas corpus can not be sought in federal court until state remedies
are exhausted). The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that when a state prisoner challenges
the constitutionality of a state administrative act, and the effect of the relief sought is
immediate release or a reduction in time to be served, his remedy is habeas corpus and not
§ 1983. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973) (allegatiQn that illegal revocation of
good conduct time credits caused prisoners to be incarcerated beyond expected time of release
is habeas corpus proceeding and not a proper § 1983 proceeding); cf. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54 (1968) (habeas corpus relief is appropriate for future as well as immediate release).
554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has pointed out on several occasions
that the legal understanding of what actions constitute cruel and unusual punishment prog-
resses with society's evolving notions of decency. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
As mankind develops toward new and more enlightened standards of what is cruel and
unusual, the legal protection afforded by the eighth amendment expands its coverage. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976). For an historical analysis of the development of the
concept in English law and its incorporation into the American legal system, see Granucci,
"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rav. 839
(1969).
" Estelle v. Garfble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that
"[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain,' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.. . . Regardless
of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause
of action under § 1983." Id. at 104-05; see note 8 supra.
12 The circuit court's opinion does not state the relief sought. Since Wester later received
adequate treatment, 554 F.2d at 1286, appropriate relief would have consisted of money
damages to compensate him for his injury. See notes 6-7 supra.
13 Wester alleged violations of both the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 554 F.2d at
1286; see Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1974) (callous indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoner constitutes violation of eighth amendment); Fitzke v. Shap-
pell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1972) (allegation that sheriff held plaintiff in custody




the prison doctor's failure to examine him thoroughly when he complained
of pain in his eye and deteriorating vision, and that the failure to examine
him ultimately resulted in a permanent visual impairment. 4 When Wester
first complained of his infirmity, a prison doctor examined him and discov-
ered no eye ailments. 5 Wester asserted, however, that when he subse-
quently complained about the persisting eye pain the doctor performed
only a cursory examination.' Later visits resulted in no examination what-
soever." The district court found no genuine issue of material fact and
entered summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of Wester's
complaint and supporting affidavits. 8 The Fourth Circuit in a per curiam
decision affirmed the lower court's judgment.
In affirming the grant of sumary judgment, the appellate court adopted
the "deliberate indifference" standard'9 enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Estelle v. Gamble.2 0 In Estelle, the complainant visited prison medical
personnel on seventeen occasions over a three month period and usually
received some form of medical treatment.' The Court refused to accept the
contention that failure to use more extensive diagnostic techniques consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment," and ruled that the prisoner's suit,
if cognizable, must be a medical malpractice suit against the examining
physician." Under a markedly dissimilar set of facts, 4 the Fourth Circuit
arrived at the same conclusion, ruling that the prison doctor's failure to
"1 554 F.2d at 1286. After Wester filed his complaint, an eye specialist examined him and
correctly diagnosed the ailment. He received adequate treatment but suffered a permanent
visual reduction. Id.
" Id.
" Id. The Wester dissent argued that the prison doctor performed no examination what-
soever after Wester's initial visit. 554 F.2d at 1287 (Winter, J., dissenting), citing Brief for
Appellant at 17. The majority opinion did not deem important the factual conflict as to the
nature of the second visit. The discrepancy was whether the doctor performed a cursory
examination or none at all. 542 F.2d at 1286.
11 Both the majority and dissent concurred that no examination was performed after
Wester's second visit. 542 F.2d at 1286; 542 F.2d at 1287 (Winter, J., dissenting).
"1 542 F.2d at 1286.
" Id.
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
21 Id. at 107.
" Id.; see note 10 supra.
1 429 U.S. at 107. Pre-Estelle courts recognized that allegations amounting to no more
than accusations of negligence are not cognizable under § 1983. Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d
873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (delay of eleven days in performing surgery at most an act of negli-
gence and not so shocking as to violate the eighth amendment); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428
F.2d 1, 6 (3rd Cir. 1970) (allegations that prisoner transfer to an institution lacking adequate
medical care violates the Constitution insufficient to state federal cause of action); Church
v. Hegstrom 416 F.2d 449, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1969) (absent additional allegation of severe or
obvious injury, mere contention that prison officials knew or should have known of prisoner's
illness is no more than allegation of negligence and not actionable under § 1983).
24 The plaintiff in Estelle saw several different doctors, underwent at least three thorough
examinations, and was prescribed various medications. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 98-
101 (1976). Wester, on the other hand, saw only one doctor and received only one thorough
examination. Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1977).
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conduct a thorough examination after his originial diagnosis did not dem-
onstrate deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner.2
Rather, the failure of the doctor to perform any further examination evi-
denced an exercise of the doctor's medical judgment.
2
1
Several circuits had adopted the deliberate indifference test prior to the
Supreme Court's holding in Estelle.2 These cases illustrate the proper
factors to be considered in determining whether actions complained of by
prisoners constitute deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical
needs rather than a permissible exercise of medical judgment.
The Second Circuit in Williams v. Vincent 5 set forth the standard that
the action alleged must have been such as to shock the conscience or
demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of the offending official.
2 9
There, the plaintiff prisoner lost part of his ear in an inmate fracas.,
Williams alleged before the district court that prison doctors told him "he
did not need his ear" and refused to attempt to suture it back after the
prisoner's request that they make an effort. 1 In reversing the lower court's
dismissal of the pro sell complaint, the Second Circuit ruled that the
district court must give petitioner the opportunity to present evidence
substantiating his civil rights claim.33 If after such showing the district
court finds that failure to attempt to sew the ear back represented a medi-
cal judgment, no valid action under 42 U.S.C. § 198311 would lie."5
In the Seventh Circuit case of Thomas v. Pate,36 the court devised a
three-step test to determine the necessity of medical care for a prisoner.
Under the Thomas test, the court must determine: first, whether an ordi-
nary physician exercising reasonable care would have determined that the
prisoner evidenced a serious injury or illness; second, whether the delay in
554 F.2d at 1286.
21 Id.; see note 23 supra.
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976); accord Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d
621, 622 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974); Thomas v.
Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 419 U.S. 813 (1974).
2' 508 F.2d 541 (2nd Cir. 1974).
29 Id. at 544.
Id. at 543.
31 Id.
31 A pro se pleading is drafted without benefit of an attorney's assistance. BLACK'S LAW
DicrIONARY 1364 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se
Litigant: More Than A Pawn in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 769 (1975). The complainant
in Wester also filed a pro se complaint, but the Wester majority did not consider this issue.
See Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J., dissenting). Since pro
se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,"
and are not dismissed unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim . . . ", Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), the Wester majority impliedly held that Wester
had not made a cognizable constitutional claim. See 554 F.2d at 1287 (Winter, J., dissenting).
1 Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
3' See note 8 supra.
Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974); see note 23 supra.
Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974).
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providing treatment increased the potential for harm; and third, whether
actual harm resulted.37 The plaintiff in Thomas alleged that medical per-
sonnel gave him penicillin when his records demonstrated that he had an
allergy to the drug. He further contended that after he experienced an
allergic reaction the prison doctor concluded, without performing an exam-
ination, that no treatment was necessary.3 The district court dismissed the
allegation, but the Seventh Circuit reversed holding that the petitioner
had stated facts sufficient to support a cause of action. 9 Consequently, the
court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that the medical care
provided was so inadequate as to amount to, in the words of the Estelle
Court, a "refusal to provide essential care," or was so markedly inappro-
priate "as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggra-
vate the prisoners' condition.""
The prisoners in each of these cases proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1'
which provides a cause of action to any person whose federal statutory or
constitutional rights have been violated by someone acting under the color
of state authority.42 In determining whether a valid section 1983 claim is
presented in cases involving a prisoner's right to medical care, courts have
considered such factors as: unwarranted delay in providing medical care
when the need is known," an attempt to harm,44 an illness or injury so
obvious as to call attention to the need for aid,45 and dismissal of a pris-
oner's complaint by a prison doctor without the performance of an exami-
nation." The plaintiff in Wester alleged no delay in being permitted to visit
the doctor and admitted that the prison physicians performed an examina-
tion.47 While Wester contended that further examinations should have
been performed," the court found that the prison doctor's failure to do so
evidenced only an exercise of the physician's medical judgment and not a
blatant disregard for the prisoner's welfare.49 Based upon this finding, the
court concluded that any negligence by the prison doctor in incorrectly
diagnosing the ailment failed to present a constitutional issue."
Id. at 158.
'Id.
" Id. The prisoner in Thomas further alleged that prison officials placed him in unsani-
tary confinement. The appellate court found that this allegation, if true, constituted an
actionable § 1983 claim. Id. at 158-59. Petitioner's additional complaint that the doctor failed
to x-ray his chest when he vomited blood raised no constitutional issue. Id. at 159; see note
23 supra.
,o Id. at 158.
4 See note 8 supra.
42 Id.
'3 Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976).
' Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973).
I' d.
,' Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970).
, 554 F.2d at 1286.
" Id.
49 Id.
0 Id.; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (incorrect diagnosis by prison
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The Fourth Circuit's holding not only comports with the other circuits'
interpretation of "deliberate indifference," but also is consistent with the
reasoning in the earlier Fourth Circuit decision of Cole v. Williams."' In
that case, petitioner Cole alleged that the prison doctor delayed calling an
eye specialist to examine him. Cole further contended that once the spe-
cialist did examine him and diagnose the ailment, the specialist found that
quick and effective treatment could have saved the vision in the afflicted
eye. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the original treatment was ade-
quate.- However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant physician on the ground that the lower court
should have read the complaint to include a charge of negligence for delay
in admitting Cole to sick call.-3 Thus, in Cole, the prison doctor's failure
to diagnose the ailment was not actionable under section 1983. Likewise
in Wester, once the Fourth Circuit concluded that the failure to perform
subsequent examinations represented an exercise of medical judgment,
Wester's only cause of action was for negligence against the doctor under
state law.54
While the issue in Wester concerned the duty of the state to provide
prisoners with medical care for physical ailments, the Fourth Circuit also
recently considered whether the state has a constitutional duty to provide
psychiatric care to mentally disturbed prisoners. In Bowring v. Godwin,55
the court held that prisoners are entitled to psychological or psychiatric
treatment if a member of the health care community determines that a
prisoner has a serious mental illness which may be cured or substantially
alleviated and that delay or denial of care increases the potential for
harm."
The Probation and Parole Board 5 denied plaintiff Bowring parole par-
tially on the ground that the result of a psychological evaluation indicated
that he could not successfully complete a parole period. Bowring main-
doctors presents a possible claim under state tort law but is not indicative of any constitu-
tional error).
" Cole v. Williams, 526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1975).
52 Id.; see note 23 supra.
11 526 F.2d 588. See note 32 supra. Prison officials allegedly delayed admitting Cole to
sick call after the fight during which he was injured. 526 F.2d 588.
" See note 50 supra.
551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
58 Id. at 47.
" Plaintiff Bowring was an inmate of the Virginia penal system. In Virginia a convicted
felon becomes eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of his term or twelve years, which-
ever period is shorter. VA. CODE § 53-251 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Virginia Parole Board
divides each claendar year into equal parts deemed most effective for administration and
reviews each prisoner's case in the segment during which the prisoner first becomes eligible
for parole. If parole is not granted at that time, the Board must continue to review the case
annually until the prisoner is paroled or discharged; however, the Board has discretionary
authority to review a prisoner's parole eligibility any time after the prisoner first becomes
eligible. Id. § 53-252 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
' 551 F.2d at 46. The Board denied plaintiff parole not only because a psychological
evaluation indicated that he was presently incapable of completing a parole period, but also
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tained that the state must provide him psychological diagnosis and treat-
ment in order that he might have an expectation of eventually qualifying
for parole. 9 He alleged that failure to provide these services constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment and a denial of due process."0 The district
court dismissed the action, holding that Bowring alleged no infringement
of a constitutional right.6" The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that
a prisoner's right to medical care 2 encompasses a right to psychiatric treat-
ment. 3
The Fourth Circuit premised its conclusion upon a finding that no
distinction separates the right to medical care for physical infirmities from
the right to medical care for psychiatric problems. 4 The court cited the
Fifth Circuit case of Newman v. Alabama"5 as its sole legal authority for
this conclusion.6 The Newman court considered the lack of any psychia-
because of the nature of the crimes for which he was convicted and his work and conduct
while incarcerated. Id.
1' Id. Parole boards exercise vast discretionary powers in granting or denying parole.
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
414 U.S. 809 (1973); see Rasmussen v. Rogen, 146 F.2d 516, 517 (7th Cir. 1947). Only when a
prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, or when a court finds that the board abused its
discretionary powers will a court remand to the board with instructions for correction. Billiteri
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2nd Cir. 1976).
The Parole Board had to give Bowring the reasons for his parole denial because of the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as
moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). In that case the Fourth Circuit decided that a grievous loss results
when the Board denies parole. The court accordingly held that due process requirements
apply to parole hearings. Hence, the Board must inform a prisoner of the reasons for denial
so that he might be aware of the changes he needs to make in order to obtain release. 519
F.2d at 732. See Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914
(1976) (prisoner denied parole must be given the basis of the denial in writing). Compare
Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975) (Board must present prisoner with reasons
underlying denial) and Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(same) with Bell v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 556 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1977) (no due process
constitutionally mandated for parole hearing) and Brown v. Lundgreen, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same). The better view is that giving a prisoner the reasons underlying a parole
denial helps him direct his actions toward possible later parole. Moreover, this serves to allay'
the resentment a prisoner may feel toward the parole board and the prison system itself by
demonstrating that the denial was not simply an arbitrary act. Johnson, Federal Parole
Procedures, 25 AD. L. REv. 459 (1973) prepared for Administrative Conference of the United
States.
80 551 F.2d at 46. See notes 11 & 13 supra.
*' See 551 F.2d at 46.
*2 See note 11 supra.
3 551 F.2d at 46, 47.
't Id. at 47.
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
" 551 F.2d at 47. The Newman case was one of the few sources examining the subject of
psychiatric care for penal inmates. For other cases and commentaries dealing with the rights
of mental patients and the duty of the state regarding civil commitment proceedings and
psychiatric treatment, see generally O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (mental
patient cannot be detained against his will if he is determined not dangerous to himself or
society and is capable of safely surviving by himself or with the aid of willing friends or
family); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 248-50 (1972) (prisoner
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trists, social workers, or counselors within the Alabama prison system as
one of many deficiencies rendering that entire system unconstitutional."7
Although the Newman court did not elaborate on the necessity of any
program of treatment, the Bowring court dictated a limited right to treat-
ment" premised upon an interpretation of the eighth amendment's prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment and the well-recognized goal of
prisoner rehabilitiation.70 Once the Bowring court equated the right to
treatment for mental disturbances with the right to treatment for physical
ailments, application of the Estelle deliberate indifference test dictated
that lack of any program to treat the mentally infirm prisoner is unconsti-
tutional.'
The Bowring court's conclusion that for the purpose of constitutionally
requiring treatment mental illness is indistinguishable from physical ma-
ladies is indicative that modern medical opinion considers mental illness
a disease that lends itself to treatment.72 Several difficulties permeate the
court's conclusion, however, and these problems raise serious questions
regarding implementation of a viable program of psychiatric care at penal
institutions.
One difficulty concerns the difference between the recognized effective-
ness of a program to treat physal ailments and treatment of psychiatric
problems. While medical programs of rehabilitation have been shown to
be effective, 73 available research data does not document the efficacy of
psychotherapeutic treatment in changing behavior patterns.74 An essential
element of the Fourth Circuit's test of whether an inmate has a right to a
committed to mental institution to determine whether his commitment should be indetermi-
nate is entitled to release if, after expiration of his prison term, no determination as to his
need to be mentally committed has been made); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)
(commitment procedures require due process whether designated civil or criminal). See also,
62 CAL. L. REV. 671-1068 (1974); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal
Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 755 (1969).
e, 503 F.2d at 1330-31.
See text accompanying note 56 supra. The Bowring court also concluded that treat-
ment provided must be necessary and not merely desirable. Moreover, the cost and time
involved in treatment must be reasonable. 551 F.2d at 47-48. But see Finney v. Arkansas Bd.
of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974) (if state cannot afford to alleviate unconstitu-
tional confinement (overcrowding), possible remedy is either to transfer or release some
prisoners); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1527 (1975).
" 551 F.2d at 48; see note 10 supra.
551 F.2d at 48. The Supreme Court stated in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974),
that rehabilitation is a paramount objective of penal institutions, a goal weighed against the
state's interest in maintaining prison internal security. Id. at 832.
7, See note 11 supra.
72 See 551 F.2d at 47.
'3 See note 74 infra.
11 Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CAL. L. Rlv. 936, 938
(1974). Chief Justice Burger also expressed reservations about psychiatrists' understanding
of human personality and behavior. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 FED.
PROB. 3, 7 (1964), cited at Ennis & Litwack, infra note 77, at 751-52.
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psychiatric program of treatment is that the disease diagnosed must be
substantially curable. 5 The highly subjective nature of both the diagnosis76
and treatment of mental illness increases the difficulty in making such a
finding." The diagnosis of mental illnnss or emotional disturbance neces-
sarily must be left to the independent judgment of the examining psychia-
trist or psychologist. Given the perplexities of psychotherapeutic treat-
ment, a psychiatrist's opinion will rarely be subject to court adjudica-
tion.7 8
While explicitly recognizing a constitutional right to a program of treat-
ment for psychiatric problems, the Bowring decision does not address the
question whether a concurrent right exists requiring diagnosis of psychiat-
ric ailments. On the Bowring facts, the Fourth Circuit ascertained a consti-
tutional need for a state evaluation of the petitioner's eligibility for treat-
ment and accordingly instructed the district court to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing to evaluate such eligibility under the Fourth Circuit's test.79
The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, is not clear as to when this duty
arises in factual circumstances different from that in Bowring. Where the
state determines, as it did in Bowring, the unsuitability of a prisoner for
parole on the basis of a psychological evaluation, the state obviously be-
lieves that the prisoner suffers some form of mental disturbance. But, when
the state makes no such determination, a prisoner will experience diffi-
culty proving his need for treatment. 0
If the Bowring opinion impliedly includes the existence of a constitu-
71 551 F.2d at 47.
78 See text accompanying note 79 infra.
7' See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
7' 551 F.2d at 48. "[Ar complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the
Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Thus, questions of medical
judgment do not rise to constitutional proportions. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1975). See note 23 supra.
" 551 F.2d at 49.
'o The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977), illus-
trates the difficulty in proving a need for psychiatric treatment. In Franklin v. Shields, 399
F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975), a federal district court indicated that at least one Virginia
prison files the results of intelligence tests and a summary of inmate interviews with state
psychologists. Id. at 313. In Wester, the Fourth Circuit held that no requirement exists for a
prison physician to perform more than one examination upon a prisoner alleging a physical
infirmity. See text accompanying note 25 supra. Hence, even if Bowring is read to include a
constitutional right to psychiatric diagnosis where files such as those described in Franklin
exist, Wester would require no further psychiatric examinations by the state unless the files
indicated some form of mental infirmity. See Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir.
1970) (reviewing court must be able to place confidence in prison medical records when
considering allegation of improper medical care). Thus, the prisoner's only recourse to secure
diagnosis would be to demonstrate a serious mental ilness so obvious as to serve notice upon
prison officials that he is sick. See Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973), wherein the
First Circuit held that either an attempt to harm a prisoner or an illness severe enough to
call attention to the need for medical aid must be present to substantiate a constitutional
tort when a prisoner alleges deprivation of medical care. Id. at 569.
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tional right to psychiatric diagnosis as well as the right to a program of
treatment, and assuming the availability of diagnostic techniques for pris-
oners and workable programs of treatment, the effect of the decision in
safeguarding the health of prisoners evinces a step forward in recognizing
the rights of the mentally ill.' The effectiveness of Bowring in achieving
this result depends upon the ability of the physician treating the prisoner 2
as well as the state's ability to underwrite the cost of administering the
program.83 The Bowring decision contains far reaching implications," but
effective implementation depends upon cooperation between prison offi-
cials and psychiatric experts, as well as the ability of those experts to
provide a meaningful service to penal inmates.
Right to Be Present During Inspection of Incoming Attorney Mail
Prisoners recently have experienced an increase in judicial recognition
of constitutional rights in the area of correspondence with persons outside
the prison walls, particularly in the area of correspondence with the in-
mate's attorney.' Although prison officials may not read mail sent by attor-
neys to their clients in prison, they may inspect the mail for contraband.
2
Several federal circuits recognize a constitutional right of prisoners to be
present when that mail is opened for inspection.3 The Supreme Court,
however, has stated that such a practice may exceed the constitutional
requirement.4 The Fourth Circuit in Crowe v. Leeke5 faced the narrow issue
11 No Supreme Court opinion grants civilly committed mental patients a constitutional
right to psychiatric treatment. Plotkin, Recent Developments in the Law of Prisoners' Rights,
11 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 417 (1975). The Fifth Circuit, however, recognizes such a right. Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (right to treatment statutorily
guaranteed). The Bowring court stated its belief that civilly committed patients have this
right. 551 F.2d at 48, n.3.
" The Bowring court recognized that psychiatric experts must define the exact contours
of relief. 551 F.2d at 28, n.3.
" See note 68 supra. See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976)
(state not at liberty to limit constitutional rights by monetary considerations).
" Since the Fourth Circuit decided Bowring, one court adopted virtually verbatim the
Bowring test for determining prisoners' constitutional right to a program of psychiatric reha-
bilitative treatment: Laaman v. Helgemae, No. 75-258 (D. N.H. July 1, 1977). See also note
81 supra.
I In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), the Supreme Court circumscribed the
ability of prison officials to censor inmate mail. Id. at 413. See text accompanying notes 14
& 15 infra.
2 See note 38 infra.
See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974); McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1066 (8th
Cir. 1973), modified, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972).
But see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 201 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978
(1972) (prison officials may open and read all correspondence).
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). The issue in Wolff was whether a consti-
tutional obligation exists which would require penal officials to do any more than permit the
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whether mail sent by attorneys may be opened in the prisoners' absence
in order to be searched for contraband. The court decided that prisoners
do not have an unqualified right to be present when their mail is in-
spected.
Petitioners, South Carolina penal inmates, alleged that their absence
at the mail opening process violated rights guaranteed by the first, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments. 7 The district court dismissed the claim as
barred by a prior action that had held that the prison mail regulations met
constitutional standards.8 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
claim was not barred either by res judicata or collateral estoppel princi-
ples.' The court then remanded the case for a determination whether pro-
tection of the inmates' sixth amendment rights required alteration in the
existing practice of opening prisoner mail. 0
On remand, the District Court was instructed to conduct an evidentiary
hearing" to balance the state's interest in excluding the prisoners against
the prisoners' right to be present when their attorney mail is opened. 2 Such
a balancing test is necessary in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
in which the Court dictated that the government interest in providing
inmate's presence at the opening of his attorney mail. The Court found that this practice
satisfied all and perhaps more than the Constitution required. Id. at 575-77. See also Procu-
nier v. Navarette, 46 U.S.L.W. 1130 (Feb. 28, 1978).
550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977).
O Id. at 188.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 185. In an earlier class action suit, Hamilton v. South Carolina, No. 72-273 (D.
S.C. Feb. 27, 1974), a federal district court held the mail regulations at issue in Crowe
constitutional. See 550 F.2d at 186. The plaintiffs in Crowe conceded that they were'members
of that class. Brief for Appellants at 4, Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977). The
district court held that this earlier action operated as res judicata to bar appellants' present
action. 550 F.2d at 186. Since the instant claim involved a continuing action, i.e., the opening
of attorney mail outside the addressee-inmate's presence, the circuit court found res judicata
inapplicable. Id. at 186-87; see Cherry, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 341
(1948).
The circuit court also considered the possibility of collateral estoppel operating to pre-
vent the present action if the same matters presented in the second case had been litigated
and determined previously. 550 F.2d at 187-88; see Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment,
56 HARv. L. Rlv. 1, 7-10 (1942). The appellate court also determined this doctrine was
inapplicable, as the precise question presented was whether attorney mail may be opened in
the prisoner's absence, which question was not litigated in the previous suit. 550 F.2d at 188.
550 F.2d at 186-88; see note 8 supra.
'0 550 F.2d at 188-89. The institution involved in Crowe used an automatic or electronic
letter opener to open mail for inspection. Appellees argued that due to the large volume of
mail, requiring the presence of inmates at the opening process would be impractical. A
substantial increase in the number of employees handling the mail would be necessary,
thereby resulting in a diversion of funds from other areas deemed more important by prison
officials. Brief for Appellees at 3, Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977). But see Finney
v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974) (cost considerations insub-
stantial when protection of prisoners' constitutional rights at issue).
" 550 F.2d at 188-89.
12 Id.
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internal security must be weighed against the constitutional interests of
the prisoner. 3 In an earlier case that formulated guidelines for the censor-
ship of inmate mail, the Court also ruled that such censorship is constitu-
tional so long as it serves a substantial government interest through pre-
serving security, order, and rehabilitation." An additional test enunciated
by the Supreme Court to determine the validity of penal regulations man-
dates a finding that constitutional limitations be no greater than necessary
to protect the government interests.' 5 Hence the Crowe court's requirement
of an evidentiary hearing" recognizes the possibility of the government
presenting valid objections to allowing the inmates' presence at the mail
opening process.
Although the Crowe court's holding implied the possibility that prison
officials could constitutionally exclude prisoners from the process, 7 the
Fourth Circuit briefly noted two cases from the First and Fifth Circuits
that reached a contrary result. 8 The First Circuit premised its requirement
that inmates be present at the mail opening process upon a finding that
prisoner-attorney correspondence requires confidentiality," and rejected
several justifications forwarded for exclusion of the prisoners. 2 Likewise
the Fifth Circuit, in holding for the prisoners, rejected prison officials'
assertion that practical considerations required prisoner exclusion from the
mail opening process. 2' That court ruled that the prisoners' right of access
"3 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The Pell court found a substantial government
interest in restricting interviews between inmates and media representatives. Even though
the restrictions hampered free exercise of first amendment rights, the Court found the state
justified in formulating these restrictions since alternative channels of communication ex-
isted. Id. at 826-27.
" Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). The Martinez Court, however, based
its decision on the first amendment rights of those with whom the prisoner corresponds rather
than the prisoner himself. Id. at 408-09; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
At least one commentator severely criticized the Court for failing to extend first amendment
rights to prisoners. See Frank & Nitsche, Civil Rights-Prisoners' Rights, 1974/1975 ANN.
SURVEY OF AM. L. 457.
" 416 U.S. at 413; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
" 550 F.2d at 188-89.
"7 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
" 550 F.2d at 188. The Fourth Circuit discussed Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1976) and Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972); see text accompanying notes
19-22 infra.
" Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972). The court conveyed its fear that
inmates and attorneys suffered inhibitions in their correspondence when prisoners suspected
prison officials of reading their attorney mail. Id.
" Id. The warden contended that the lower court's ruling requiring inmate presence at
the mail opening process implied that he would violate any order prohibiting him from
reading inmate mail. The Robbins court rejected the contention that this possible indignity
warranted exclusion of prisoners from the mail opening process. Id.
2, Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473 n.16 (5th Cir. 1976). Prison officials contended in
Taylor that requiring the inmates' presence at the opening of mail creates an onerous admin-
istrative burden. The court's opinion found no evidence in the record to support this conten-
tion and expressed doubt that cost factors warrant consideration when dealing with funda-
mental constitutional rights. Id.
[Vol. XXXV
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
to the courts mandated their presence as assurance that no one would read
their attorney mail.
22
The Fourth Circuit's order requiring an evidentiary hearing probably
indicates only the court's ufiwillingness to decide the issue upon an incom-
plete set of facts." An important element when considering the implica-
tions of the Crowe decision is the general rejection by other circuit courts
of the reasons forwarded for excluding prisoners at the opening process. 4
The Crowe opinion failed to indicate clearly what grounds are sufficient
for enforcing the prison's present practice of excluding prisoners. 25 Other
circuits have rejected reasons such as increased security rules,26 delay in
the mail process," indignity to prison officials, 28 and the onerous cost bur-
den. 29 In light of the rejection by other circuits of reasons forwarded to
justify inmate exclusion, the Fourth Circuit likely will rule in the prisoners'
favor when considering the question upon a complete set of facts.
Although the Crowe court's opinion recognized the Supreme Court's
test of balancing prisoners' constitutional rights against state security in-
terests,"0 the Fourth Circuit's adoption of sixth amendment rights for pris-
oners 31 exceeded existing Supreme Court rulings. Dictum in the Supreme
Court opinion of Wolff v. McDonnell2 underscored the fact that the sixth
amendment only protects the attorney-client relationship within the crimi-
nal setting." Although the Supreme Court did not address the operative
effects of the sixth amendment,34 the Fifth Circuit recognized the potential
2 Id. at 470-78.
" The Crowe court expressed a reluctance to decide a constitutional issue without a
complete record before it. 550 F.2d at 189. The Fourth Circuit thereby followed the logic
expressed by the Eighth Circuit in Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972). Confronted
with an inadequate record upon which to formulate a remedy, the Moore court remanded the
case to assimilate evidence to be used in weighing the prisoners' interest in rightful access to
the courts against the prison security interest. Id. at 577.
24 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra & 26-29 infra.
21 550 F.2d at 188-89. Factors deemed relevant by the Crowe court in deciding the feasi-
bility of allowing inmate presence included inmate fear that prison officials read their attor-
ney mail, the practicality of permitting random observation of the opening process, and other
means to inspect for contraband which preclude the necessity for opening mail. Id.
" Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974).
v Id.
21 Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972).
" Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473 n.16 (5th Cir. 1976).
" See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
1 550 F.2d at 188. The Crowe court asserted without discussion that sixth amendment
privileges extend to penal inmates.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974).
Id. at 575-76; see note 3 supra. The Eighth Circuit in McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d
1059 (8th Cir. 1973), refuted defendant's argument that prison officials could not definitively
ascertain that purported attorney letters were in fact from attorneys. The court stated that a
telephone call to the attorney of record would determine if he sent the letter should prison
officials doubt the letter's validity. 483 F.2d at 1067; see Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392,
395 (D. Mass. 1971) (prison officials may use fluoroscopes or metal detecting devices; they
may manually manipulate envelopes; attorneys unable to send packages; placement of sealed
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effect of the Supreme Court's statement as implying an absence of sixth
amendment rights in a prison context. 5 That court based its decision
granting prisoners the right to be present at the mail opening process upon
an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment guaranteeing prisoners a
right of access to the courts. 6 By arguing that effective assistance of coun-
sel was essential to protecting the fourteenth amendment right, the Fifth
Circuit extended constitutional protection to attorney-inmate correspond-
ence.37 When the Fourth Circuit later examines a question similar to the
one presented in Crowe, a legal analysis grounding the prisoners' right in
the fourteenth rather than the sixth amendment would serve to minimize
the possibility of conflict over the issue of prisoners' sixth amendment
rights to counsel. Thus, a Fourth Circuit decision granting inmates an
unqualified fourteenth amendment right to be present when prison offi-
cials open their attorney mail would not only concur with most recent
federal decisions, 38 but also would withstand Supreme Court scrutiny.
Pursuing Rights In Forma Pauperis
A prisoner unable to meet the costs of bringing suit to litigate alleged
prisoner's letter inside an envelope with an explanatory cover letter sent to prison superin-
tendent). See also Note, Judicial Recognition of Prisoners' Constitutional Right to Send and
Receive Mail, 76 DICK. L. REv. 775, 787-88 (1972).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants in McDonnell argued for a ruling that
the practice of opening attorney mail solely to inspect for contraband in the addressee-
prisoner's presence was constitutional. The Court found no need to address the application
of the first, sixth, or fourteenth amendments. 418 U.S. at 575.
3 Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976). "Since the right to effective counsel
extends only to criminal- matters . . . it is applicable solely to pretrial detainees or to a
convicted prisoner being tried on additional charges or contesting the legality of a previous
conviction." Id. at 472.
-, Id. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (assuring prisoners meaningful access to
courts requires state to provide either law library or some alternative scheme such as training
of inmates as para-legal assistants, use of law students, or use of full-time staff attorneys);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (corollary to due process guarantee requires
access to courts for prisoners to seek redress for violations of constitutional rights); Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison officials not to impair or abridge prisoners' right of access
to courts in seeking writ of habeas corpus); see text accompanying note 29 infra. But see Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (heretofore, only guarantee of access to courts for
prisoners extended to right to prepare a petition or complaint). See also Bach v. Illinois, 504
F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 410 (1974) (effective assistance of counsel
and access to the courts).
1 532 F.2d at 473.
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976) (presence of prisoner required
during mail opening); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.) (same); McDonnell v.
Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir. 1973) (prisoners' attorney mail opened only under proba-
ble cause and then only in inmate's presence); Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir.
1972) (presence of prisoner required at mail opening); accord, Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp.
14, 24 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 210 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Palmigiano
v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788-89 (D. R.I. 1970). Contra, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2nd Cir. 1971) (prison officials may open and read all correspondence).
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constitutional deprivations can seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis.'
Section 1915 of title 28 of the United States Code,2 which grants federal
courts the authority to allow filing of suits without prepayment of costs,
also provides that courts may dismiss such suits if satisfied that the action
is frivolous.' In Graham v. Riddle,4 the Fourth Circuit held that section
1915 grants district courts the power to review prisoner complaints before
the action is filed and deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis upon a
finding that the complaint is frivolous.5
Plaintiff Graham, a Virginia prisoner, filed six complaints with the
district court during a five month period, each dealing with the nature of
the food provided by the prison.' Each compalint included a motion for
leave to file in forma pauperis which the district court routinely granted.'
Each complaint was dismissed upon a determination that it was frivolous.
8
The sixth dismissal included an order than denied Graham further leave
to file in forma pauperis "except upon good cause shown."9 The district
court denied six subsequent motions requesting leave to file in forma pau-
peris.'0 Without contesting the findings of frivolity," Graham asked the
appellate court to rule that leave to file in forma pauperis cannot be condi-
tioned upon the merits of a complaint.2 The Fourth Circuit held that
district courts need not grant leave to file in forma pauperis before dis-
missing a frivolous complaint, and that th6 trial court may review a com-
plaint prior to its filing and dismiss it under the authority of section
1915(d).
13
The widely accepted view is that the court first should grant petitioner
leave to proceed in forma pauperis before dismissing the action on a finding
, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970). Section 1915(a) permits any United States court to author-
ize the commencement of a civil suit without prepayment of costs or the posting of security
for costs. The applicant must state by affidavit his inability to bear the costs of the suit. In
addition, he must state the nature of his action and his belief that he is entitled to relief.
2 Id. § 1915.
3 Id. § 1915(d). This section permits dismissal of suits brought under section 1915(a) if
the applicant's allegation of poverty is untrue or if the court is satisfied that the action is
malicious or frivolous. A frivolous plea is one which the court determines to have no basis for
prosecution, thereby evincing the pleader's bad faith in bringing the suit. United States v.
Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224 (D. N.J. 1934), reu'd other grounds, 77 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1935); see,
e.g., Durham v. United States, 400 F.2d 879, (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 932 (1968)
(inability of petitioner to make a rational legal or factual argument in his behalf constitutes
sufficient grounds to deny him the right to prosecute his claim in forma pauperis).
554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977).




Graham v. Slayton, No. 195-73-R (E.D. Va. April 12, 1973), aff'd sub. nom, Graham
v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977).
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that the complaint is frivolous.' 4 This process insures that an adequate
record of the proceeding is made.'5 Nevertheless, the approach taken by the
Fourth Circuit also has certain advantages. Under both views, the court
can consider previous complaints to determine whether a petitioner's pres-
ent complaint is legitimate.'" The Fourth Circuit's approach has the addi-
tional advantages of filtering out frivolous claims and deterring abuse of
in forma pauperis proceedings."
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Fourth Circuit found that the
authority to dismiss a frivolous case includes the implicit authority to find
a complaint frivolous, and to dismiss it upon that ground without first
requiring the court to file the action.'8 Since Graham retained the right to
file any claims he desired to prosecute by first paying the fifteen dollar
filing fee, and also retained the right to proceed in forma pauperis "upon
good cause shown,"'" he was not denied access to the court system."9
The Fourth Circuit further premised its conclusion upon a finding that
Graham had abused the statutory right to proceed in forma pauperis.2 ' In
this respect the Graham opinion is in accord with a similar decision ren-
" Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1975); Duhart v. Carlson, 469
F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Conway v. Fugge, 439 F.2d 1397
(9th Cir. 1971); Hawkins v. Elliott, 385 F. Supp. 354 (D. S.C. 1974). While the discretionary
power of a district court to dismiss a suit is especially broad with regard to prisoners attemting
to proceed in forma pauperis, Conway v. Fugge, 439 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971); see Shobe v.
California, 362 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966), apparently only two
circuits have faced the precise issue whether leave to proceed in forma pauperis can be denied
prior to filing a complaint. Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977); West v. Procunier,
452 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971).
,1 A permanent record of the proceeding inures both to the benefit of the plaintiff and
defendant. The plaintiff has a record upon which to base a possible appeal claiming abuse of
the district court's discretionary authority to dismiss the suit, and the defendant is protected
from similar suits in the future. Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir.
1975); Campbell v. Beto, 460 F,2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972).
16 Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975) (court
may consider its own records in determining validity of in forma pauperis proceeding); accord
Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972); Conway v Oliver, 429 F.2d 1307, 1308
(9th Cir. 1970). The Graham court not only reviewed the record of petitioner's first six
complaints but also took notice of the nature of the subsequent complaints which the district
court had refused to file. 554 F.2d at 134. Thus, the Fourth Circuit had a basis upon which
to determine whether Graham abused the statutory right to proceed in forma pauperis, and
thereby decide whether the district court justifiably forbade him further leave so to prosecute
his complaints.
" See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
" 554 F.2d at 134-35. See West v. Procunier, 452 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1971) (where
petitioner filed 10 complaints in three month period, order issued that further complaints be
reviewed and filed only if deemed to have merit); Mann v. Leeke, 73 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. S.C.
1974), afl'd, 551 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1975) (prisoner denied further leave to proceed in forma
pauperis due to frivolous nature of present suit and prior filing and dismissal of habeas corpus
petitions).
" 554 F.2d at 133.
21 The Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), recognized prisoners'
fundamental right of access to the court. system. See Part B, note 36 supra.
21 554 F.2d at 135. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
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dered by the Ninth Circuit in West v. Procunier.22 The West court affirmed
a district court order requiring a certain prisoner's complaints to be lodged
with the court clerk and filed only if the lower court deemed the complaints
meritorious.3 The court there found a need to restrict the prisoner's prolific
filing of in forma pauperis complaints inasmuch as ten such complaints
had been filed during a three month period.
2 4
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of dismiss-
ing in forma pauperis complaints prior to filing, the Court recently has
noted that courts do pass judgment on the merits of a case before granting
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.2 The Court cited that fact as partial
justification for a ruling that prisons must provide law libraries to help
enable prisoners to draft complaints not subject to dismissal on a finding
of a lack of merit.
2
1
The power of a court to deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the
basis of the complaint is not dictated by the language of section 1915(d).2
However, both the Graham and West courts recognized the implicit power
of courts to restrict the use of the proceedings.2 This power to dismiss is
justified by the policy underlying section 1915(d). That underlying policy
is to safeguard the public from persons who abuse the right to proceed in
forma pauperis by attempting to subject those whom they hold in disfavor
to vexatious and frivolous legal proceedings.2 9 The Graham decision not
only better protects prison officials from vexatious lawsuits, but also pre-
sents a method of reducing the burdensome number of prisoners' rights
cases prosecuted in federal courts" while insuring that legitimate com-
plaints still will be heard.
MARK R. DAVIS
- 452 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971).
2 Id. at 646.
24 Id.
2 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977). In Bounds, the Court expressly reserved
judgment on the practice of judging the merits of an in forma pauperis complaint before filing.
Id. at 826 n.15.
", 430 U.S. 817; see Part B, note 36 supra.
n Section 1915(d) of Title 28 provides that "[tihe court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation
of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d) (1970).
21 See note 18 supra.
" Caviness v. Somers, 235 F.2d 455, 456 (4th Cir. 1956), quoting O'Connell v. Mason,
132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904). The prisoner in Caviness alleged mistreatment by a United
States Marshall while in confinement. The district court dismissed the action on the basis
that the complaint lacked merit. The Fourth Circuit affirmed after a finding that nothing in
the record indicated an abuse of discretion by the district court.
" For a discussion of the overwhelming caseload within the federal system, see Reming-
ton, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 Amz. ST. L.J. 549, wherein the
author discussed some of the problems, and possible remedies, presented by the increased
case load of federal courts due to the flood of state prisoner litigation in the federal court
system.
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